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Abstract
Here we identify a type of privacy concern in Dis-
tributed Constraint Optimization (DCOPs) not pre-
viously addressed in literature, despite its importance
and impact on the application field: the privacy of ex-
istence of secrets. Science only starts where metrics
and assumptions are clearly defined. The area of Dis-
tributed Constraint Optimization has emerged at the
intersection of the multi-agent system community and
constraint programming. For the multi-agent commu-
nity, the constraint optimization problems are an ele-
gant way to express many of the problems occurring
in trading and distributed robotics. For the theoretical
constraint programming community the DCOPs are a
natural extension of their main object of study, the
constraint satisfaction problem. As such, the under-
standing of the DCOP framework has been refined with
the needs of the two communities, but sometimes with-
out spelling the new assumptions formally and there-
fore making it difficult to compare techniques. Here we
give a direction to the efforts for structuring concepts
in this area.
Introduction
We identify the “privacy of existence of secrets” as a
not yet formally explored issue in the area of the Dis-
tributed Constraint Optimization problems (DCOPs).
In order to scientifically draw conclusions about a con-
cept or procedure, it is essential to formally define the
involved concepts, metrics, and assumptions. Conse-
quently, we also revisit some common concepts to sug-
gest a direction for the possible structuring of DCOP
frameworks.
The distributed constraint optimization has emerged
at the confluence of research in Multi-Agent Systems
and research in Constraint Programming. The multi-
agent community has found in the DCOP framework
an elegant way to specify requirements existing in the
area of cooperating robot teams, negotiation, and trad-
ing. For the Constraint Programming community, the
DCOP is a natural extension of a framework that is
at the center of their field, the constraint satisfaction
problem (CSP). The reasons and the expectations from
the new DCOP framework are slightly different for the
researchers in the involved areas, differences that for
various reasons are sometimes not spelled formally in-
side the DCOP definitions, making comparison and ref-
erence difficult and error-prone for new researchers in
this booming area.
The Constraint Programming community has devel-
oped an impressive body of knowledge and set of tech-
niques focused on improving the efficiency of problems
represented as constraint satisfaction problems (CSP)
and for various extensions of such problems includ-
ing the egalitarian Fuzzy CSPs (FCSPs), Probabilistic
CSPs (PCSPs), dynamic CSPs (DCSPs), the utilitar-
ian Weighted CSPs (WCSPs), and the general Valued
CSPs (VCSPs) (Schiex et al. 1995) and Semiring based
CSPs (Bistarelli et al. 1999). The Constraint Program-
ming community is careful in formally defining each ex-
tension to CSPs and clearly stating each framework by
specifying formally and exactly the inputs and unam-
biguously defining outputs and evaluation metrics. This
allows for work in the Constraint Programming field
to be largely unambiguously comparable, and technol-
ogy transfer between extensions to be possible with-
out need of repeating work. However, most research
in that area concerns efficiency while privacy and se-
crecy of constraints are generally not part of the CSP
community criteria. An early set of extensions of the
CSP family to the multi-agent world addressed paral-
lelism (Kasif 1990), and continued to be focused solely
on efficiency, as constraint were considered shared be-
tween agents.
The seminal work in (Yokoo et al. 1992) brought the
concept of a distribution of CSPs where privacy was
mentioned as a motivation, besides natural distribu-
tions of the constraints and control of variables to
agents, as a reason to not attempt sharing constraints
except on a need basis during a distributed backtrack-
ing effort. While this is also seen as an extension of
the CSP family, the efficiency was no longer a sufficient
criteria and direct comparison with traditional central-
ized constraints was seen as irrelevant, despite a lack of
formal specification of the impediments to additional
constraint sharing in terms of either technical cost or
quantified privacy constraints. This lack of specifica-
tion gave birth to a flurry of works exploiting various
amounts of constraint information without quantifica-
tion and with efficiency gains whose trade-off was not al-
ways clear (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000a)
in terms of the privacy or in terms of the technical cost
of constraint data centralization.
In a concern to make the field coherent and easily
maintain scientific soundness, the constraint commu-
nity recommended at the CP2000 distributed constraint
satisfaction workshop panel to name the new family
of extensions by appending distributed in front of each
CSP extension, yielding:
• distributed constraint satisfaction (DisCSP)
• distributed fuzzy constraint satisfaction (DisFCSP)
• distributed probabilistic constraint satisfaction (Dis-
PCSP)
• distributed dynamic constraint satisfaction (DisD-
CSP or DisDyCSP)
• distributed weighted constraint satisfaction (Dis-
WCSP)
• distributed valued constraint satisfaction (DisVCSP)
• distributed semiring-based constraint satisfaction
(DisSCSP)
Works had started to confusingly use the acronym
DCSP for distributed CSPs, conflicting with the
acronym for dynamic CSPs. It was recommended for
the new frameworks to use the prefix ”Dis” rather than
”D” as a way to differentiate from dynamic CSPs which
were intensively studied at the time. It was suggested
that the latter be referred as DyCSP to further reduce
confusion. Later, additional types of problem emerged,
highlighting the wisdom of the suggestion, namely:
• dynamic distributed constraint satisfaction (Dy-
DisCSP)
• dynamic distributed dynamic constraint satisfaction
(DyDisDyCSP)
where besides a dynamism in constraint emergence
there also exist a dynamism in agent involve-
ment (i.e., churning) or in constraint redistribu-
tion (Silaghi et al. 2001; Silaghi and Faltings 2002b).
However, while privacy was already a stated motiva-
tion for distributed CSPs, (and by extension assumed
present in all these frameworks), it remained unspeci-
fied formally, perpetuating the difficulty of correct com-
parison and evaluation of proposed techniques.
Meanwhile, the multi-agent community adopted the
new direction and developed techniques coining the
name “distributed constraint optimization” (DCOP)
for a framework of distributed weighted constraints.
For the early DCOPs definitions, privacy was also
not formally stated, and the names DCOP and Dis-
WCSP coexisted for a while until the community largely
adopted the DCOP acronym. Extensions in this com-
munity are built on the DCOP concept, such as in the
case of Leximin DCOPs (Matsui et al. 2018).
Further research noticed the negative effects from
lack of formal definitions and quantification of pri-
vacy criteria in the distributed CSP family. At-
tempts to fix the problem either redefined the
framework (Silaghi et al. 2005) without changing its
name/acronym (in an effort to redeem or adopt ear-
lier work that stressed privacy), or alternatively pro-
posed new names and acronyms. New proposed
names/acronyms appeared in the case of distributed
Privacy CSPs (DisPrivCSPs) or distributed privacy
DCOPs (DisPrivCOPs) (Doshi et al. 2008) and Util-
itarian CSPs (UCSPs) or Utilitarian DCOPs (UD-
COP) (Savaux et al. 2016; Savaux et al. 2017). Work
has also addressed the classification of the nature of
privacy concerns, as in (Le´aute´ and Faltings 2013).
In this work, privacy is defined as a value:
Definition 1 Privacy is the utility that agents draw
from conserving the secrecy of their personal informa-
tion.
In the Background section, we review the original
and main formal definitions of distributed constraint
satisfaction (DisCSP) and distributed constraint op-
timization problems (DCOPs/DisWCSPs), as well as
the main informal privacy classifications in literature.
We also introduce the concept of steganography, which
is more intensively studied in the area of Cryptol-
ogy. In the Steganographic DCOP section we then
present motivation and define formally the Stegano-
graphic DCOPs. Further in the Frameworks Disam-
biguation section we propose a direction for the struc-
ture of the nomenclature and definitions for various con-
cepts in the DCOP areas. We conclude with a summary
of the contributions.
Background
We start by reviewing the main constraint optimiza-
tion frameworks as emerging from constraint satisfac-
tion. Later we review the various classifications of pri-
vacy found in literature, and the definitions we used for
privacy and steganography.
Formal Distributed Constraint
Optimization Frameworks
Several distributed CSPs are based on the CSP frame-
work:
Definition 2 (CSP (Yokoo et al. 1998)) A CSP
consists of n variables x1, x2, ..., xn, whose values are
taken from finite, discrete domains D1, D2, ..., Dn
respectively, and a set of constraints on their values. A
constraint is defined by a predicate. That is, the con-
straint pk(xk1, ..., xkj) is a predicate that is defined on
the Cartesian product Dk1× ...×Dkj. This predicate is
true iff the value assignment of these variables satisfies
this constraint. Solving a CSP is equivalent to finding
an assignment of values to all variables such that all
constraints are satisfied.
The first distributed CSP definition
from (Yokoo et al. 1992; Yokoo et al. 1998) is:
Definition 3 (DCSP (Yokoo et al. 1998)) There
exist m agents: 1, 2, ...,m. Each variable xj be-
longs to one agent i (this relation is represented as
belongs(xj, i)). Constraints are also distributed among
agents. The fact that an agent l knows a constraint
predicate pk is represented as known(pk, l).
A Distributed CSP is solved iff the following condi-
tions are satisfied:
∀i, ∀xj where belongs(xj, i), the value of xj is
assigned to some value dj, and ∀l, ∀pk where
known(pk, l), pk is true under the assignment xj = dj.
As observed, even as (Yokoo et al. 1998) has a sec-
tion dedicated to privacy motivations, the formal def-
inition does not specify a way to quantify privacy re-
quirements and costs. Further, the semantic of variable
ownership specified with the belongs predicate is not
further formally defined except as implied by the fact
that in the proposed algorithms, new assignments for a
variable are only proposed by the agents to which the
variable belongs.
While this definition assumes that the num-
ber of agents equals the number of variables,
with each agent keeping secret the domain of
exactly one variable, other versions studied the
case of unequal numbers of variables and agents
with no secret domains but with secret con-
straints (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000b).
Definition 4 (DisCSP (Silaghi and Faltings 2005))
Distributed constraint satisfaction problems (DisCSPs)
is defined by:
• a set of n variables X = {x1, ..., xn},
• a set of n domains, D = {d1, ..., dn}, for the vari-
ables,
• a set of t constraints, C = {c1 = (xi, xj , ...), ..., ct},
each of which is a subset of the set of variables, linked
with a relation, and
• a set of t relations, R = {r1, ..., rt}. ri gives the al-
lowed value combinations for the corresponding con-
straint ci.
• a set of m independent but communicating agents
A = {A0, .., Am}
• an ownership mapping M : X ∪ C → P(A) that
assigns each variable or constraint to the subset of
agents that own it. P(A) is a common notation for
the set of subsets of A.
A solution to a CSP is an assignment of values from
the corresponding domains to each variable such that
for all constraints, the combination of assigned values
is allowed by the corresponding relation.
The Distributed Constraint Optimization Framework
was introduced in (Modi et al. 2002).
Definition 5 (DCOP (Modi et al. 2002)) A Dis-
tributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP)
consists of n variables V = {x1, x2, ...xn}, each assigned
to an agent, where the values of the variables are taken
from finite, discrete domains D1, D2, ...Dn, respectively.
Only the agent who is assigned a variable has control of
its value and knowledge of its domain.
The goal is to choose values for variables such that
an objective function is minimized or maximized. The
objective function described is addition over costs, but
can be any associative, commutative, monotonic ag-
gregation operator defined over a totally ordered set
of valuations, with minimum and maximum element
(described by Schiex, Fargier and Verfaillie as Valued
CSPs (Schiex et al. 1995)).
The definition in (Modi et al. 2002) makes a formal
link to the Weighted CSP instance of the Valued CSP
framework while claiming generality in terms of appli-
cation to remaining CSP extensions.
However, while further stressing the control of values,
it limits input secrecy to domains and does not further
quantify effects of privacy loss or penalties for discus-
sions by agents about values that they do not “control”.
Despite the framework not quantifying privacy,
measurements of privacy loss based on qualitative com-
parisons were made in (Silaghi and Faltings 2002a),
and based on using assumptions from informa-
tion theory, outside the standard DCOP def-
initions, in (Freuder, Minca, and Wallace 2001;
Franzin et al. 2002; Wallace and Silaghi 2004;
Maheswaran et al. 2006) and in
(Greenstadt, Pearce, and Tambe 2006;
Faltings, Le´aute´, and Petcu 2008).
An effort to redefine DisCSPs to formalize privacy
requirements is in (Silaghi et al. 2005):
Definition 6 (DisCSP (Silaghi et al. 2005)) A
[Cryptographic] Distributed CSP (DisCSP) is defined
by six sets (A,X,D,C, I, O) and an algebraic structure
F . A = {A1, ..., An} is a set of agents. X, D, and the
solution are defined like for CSPs.
I = {I1, ..., In} is a set of secret inputs. Ii is a tuple
of αi secret inputs (defined on F ) from the agent Ai.
Each input Ii belongs to F
αi .
Like for CSPs, C is a set of constraints. There may
exist a public constraint in C, φ0, defined by a predicate
φ0(ε) on tuples of assignments ε, known to everybody.
However, each constraint φi, i > 0, in C is defined as
a set of known predicates φi(ε, I) over the secret inputs
I, and the tuples ε of assignments to all the variables
in a set of variables Xi, Xi ⊆ X.
O = {o1, ..., on} is the set of outputs to the different
agents. Let m be the number of variables. oi : D1 ×
...×Dm → F
ωi is a function receiving as parameter a
solution and returning ωi secret outputs (from F ) that
will be revealed only to the agent Ai.
This definition uses the same name and acronym
as previously encountered definitions of distributed
CSPs, but formally specifies that solutions may only
be revealed to specific agents (introducing a con-
cept now referred in literature as privacy of deci-
sion (Le´aute´ and Faltings 2013)). The formulation re-
quires that there should not be any kind of privacy loss,
being mainly appropriate for cryptographic techniques.
The extension of such privacy formalization to
DCOPs is reported in (Silaghi 2005a):
Definition 7 (DisWCSP (Silaghi 2005a)) A dis-
tributed constraint satisfaction problem (DisWCSP) is
defined by six sets (A,X,D,C, I, O), an arithmetic
structure F , and a set of acceptable solution qualities
B, that can be often represented as an interval [B1, B2].
A = {A1, ..., An} is a set of agents. X = {x1, ..., xm}
is a set of variables and D = {D1, ..., Dm} is a set of
finite domains such that xi can take values only from
Di = {v
i
1, ..., v
i
di
}.
An assignment is a pair 〈xi, v
i
k〉 meaning that the
variable xi is assigned the value v
i
k.
A tuple is an ordered set. I = {I1, ..., In} is a set of
secret inputs. Ii is a tuple of αi secret inputs (defined
on a set F ) from the agent Ai. Each input Ii belongs
to Fαi .
C = {φ0, ..., φc} is a set of constraints. A constraint
φi weights the legality of each combination of assign-
ments to the variables of an ordered subset Xi of the
variables in X, Xi ⊆ X. φ0 is a public constraint de-
fined by a function φ0(ε) on tuples of assignments ε,
known to everybody. Each constraint φi, i > 0, in C
is defined as a known function φi(ε, I) over the secret
inputs I, and the tuples ε of assignments to all the vari-
ables in a set of variables Xi, Xi ⊆ X.
The projection of a tuple ε of assignments over a tuple
of variables Xi is denoted ε|Xi . A solution is:
ε∗ = argminε∈D1×...×Dn
c∑
i=1
φi(ε|Xi),
if
∑c
i=1 φi(ε
∗
|Xi
) ∈ [B1...B2].
O = {o1, ..., on} is the set of outputs to the different
agents. oi : I × D1 × ... × Dm → F
ωi is a function
receiving as parameter the inputs and a solution, and
returning ωi secret outputs (from F ) that will be re-
vealed only to the agent Ai. The problem is to generate
O.
The above DCOP framework was designed to be ad-
dressed with cryptographic protocols and allows for
chaining multiple DCOPs for solving complex problems
such as Vickrey Auctions (Silaghi 2005a). It does not
support non-cryptographic privacy aware solvers as it
does not model costs for partial privacy leaks,
Frameworks for DCOP With Privacy for
Non-cryptographic Solvers The quantifica-
tion of privacy in distributed CSPs is introduced
in (Savaux et al. 2016), to enable the evaluation of
non-cryptographic solvers:
Definition 8 (UDCSP) A UDisCSP is formally de-
fined as a tuple 〈A, V,D,C, U,R〉 where:
• A = 〈A1, ..., An〉 is a vector of n agents
• V = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 is a vector of n variables. Each agent
Ai controls the variable xi.
• D = 〈D1, ..., Dn〉 where Di is the domain for the vari-
able xi, known only to Ai, and a subset of {1, ..., d}.
• C = {C1, ..., Cm} is a set of interagent constraints.
• U = {u1,1, ..., un,d} is a matrix of privacy costs where
ui,j is the cost of agent Ai for revealing whether j ∈
Di.
• R = 〈r1, ..., rn〉 is a vector of rewards, where ri is the
reward agent Ai receives if an agreement is found.
An agreement as a set of assignments for all the vari-
ables with values from their domain, such that all the
constraints are satisfied.
The state of agent Ai includes the subset of Di that
it has revealed, as well as the achievement of an agree-
ment. The problem is to define a set of communication
actions and a policy for each agent such that their util-
ity is maximized.
Another framework that allows for privacy loss but
quantifies it was proposed in (Doshi et al. 2008). It is
defined formalizing the concept of revelation:
Definition 9 (Revelation) Given a set of Boolean
(propositional) secrets S and a set of agents A, a possi-
ble revelation R(A,S) is a function R(A,S) : A× S →
[0, 1] which maps each peer agent and a secret to the
probability learned by that agent about the secret.
Definition 10 (DPCOP (Doshi et al. 2008))
A (minimization) Distributed Private Constraint
Optimization Problem (DPCOP) is defined by a tuple
(A,X,D,C, P, U). A is a set of agents {A1, ..., AK}.
X is a set of variables {x1, ..., xn}, and D is a set of
domains {D1, ..., Dn} such that each variable xi may
take values only from the domain Di. The variables
are subject to a set C of sets of weighted constraints
{C0, C1, ..., CK}, where Ci = {φ
1
i , ..., φ
ci
i } holds the
secret weighted constraints of agent Ai, and C0 holds
the public constraints. Each weighted constraint is
defined as a function φi : Xi → R+ where Xi ⊆ X.
The value of such a function in an input point is called
constraint entry, and each Ci can be seen as a set
Ci of such constraint entries. P is a set of privacy
loss cost functions {P1, ..., PK}, one for each agent.
Pi defines the cost inflicted to Ai by each revelation
r of its secrets, i.e., Pi(r) : R(A,Ci) → R+. U is a
set {U1, ..., UK}. Ui is the reward received by Ai if a
solution is found (used for deciding to abandon the
search).
A solution is an agreement between agents in A on a
tuple ǫ∗ of assignments of values to variables that min-
imizes the total cost:
ǫ = argminǫ
∑
i

∑
j
φj(ǫ)

+ Pi
(∏
i
(ǫ)
)
where
∏
i(ǫ) is the revelation R(A,Ci) during the pro-
cess leading to the agreement on the assignments ǫ.
This definition quantifies privacy and drops the con-
cept of control by agents on variables, which we de-
scribe as unclear in previous definitions. A vari-
ant related to UDCSP is described and evaluated
in (Savaux et al. 2017).
Privacy Classifications
There are several efforts to classify privacy
concepts in distributed constraint optimiza-
tion (Le´aute´ and Faltings 2013).
• Domain Privacy As Existence of Values The ex-
planation in (Yokoo et al. 1998) concerning the first
distributed CSP definition can be interpreted as de-
scribing a privacy concerning the very existence of
values in domains. This goes to the point where the
constraints of other agents cannot be defined exten-
sionally due to the impossibility to enumerate these
domains (e.g., impossibility to enumerate all meeting
places that an agent controlling the corresponding
variable may think about). This kind of domain pri-
vacy was highlighted in (Brito and Meseguer 2003).
• Domain Privacy As Unary Constraint The first
types of privacy mentioned in (Yokoo et al. 1998)
are domain and constraint privacy. Domain pri-
vacy is frequently understood as a unary constraint
on the values of a variable (Yokoo et al. 1998).
This interpretation is assumed in many subse-
quent works, where agents’ constraints are assumed
to be extensionally defined using mutual knowl-
edge of the values in domains of each others’
variables (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000b;
Modi et al. 2002).
• Constraint Privacy
Constraint privacy is linked to the knows pred-
icate in the original distributed CSP defini-
tion (Yokoo et al. 1998). Later work propose
to drop the variable controlling assumptions
in exchange for focusing on constraint pri-
vacy (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000a;
Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000b). Inter-
mediary frameworks allowing for some constraint
privacy by distribution in order to maintain the
notion of control of variables have also been proposed
by splitting binary constraints into private halves,
but it is unclear if the under-defined control of
variables offers a tradeoff for the reduced constraint
privacy.
• Privacy of Existence of Solution
The fact that the problem in not solvable may in itself
be a secret and impact on revelation of information.
This privacy was addressed first in (Silaghi 2005b),
based on stochastically discarding solutions even in
problems found solvable by systematic solvers, to
hide solution existence.
• Privacy of Decision The decision, as to what value
is assigned to an individual variable in the final so-
lution, only needs to be revealed to a predefined set
of agents, and this was introduced in (Silaghi 2004b;
Silaghi et al. 2005).
• Privacy of Assignments
The individual values being tried during search
by an agent can be secret and certainly reveal
secrets about unary constraint of the proposer. This
privacy is arguably at least partially achieved by the
original ABT algorithm in (Yokoo et al. 1992) where
assignments are only announced to relevant agents.
A twist where values are only revealed by relation
was sometimes also claimed to increase this pri-
vacy (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000b;
Brito and Meseguer 2003). It is unclear
whether cryptographic algorithms offer this pri-
vacy or it is simply irrelevant for them, as
no proposal is made in them (Silaghi 2004a;
Silaghi and Mitra 2004).
• Privacy of Algorithms
The privacy of algorithm is typically defined as a pri-
vacy with respect to what reasoning processes are
performed by an agent, other than the constraints on
possible messages enforced by the commonly agreed
solver protocol. Such privacy of algorithms is de-
scribed in (Silaghi and Faltings 2002a). In solutions
based on cryptographic protocols the equivalent con-
cept for enforcing privacy of algorithm is introduced
in (Silaghi and Friedrich 2005; Silaghi 2005a), allow-
ing for the definition of a stronger level of privacy:
requested privacy.
Definition 11 (requested privacy) Given secret
inputs σ, the prior knowledge Γ of t colluders and a
multi-party computation process Π with answer α that
can be decomposed in a desired data α∗ and an algo-
rithmic dependent unrequested data α¯, we say that an
algorithm A achieves requested t-privacy if the proba-
bility distribution of the secrets that an attacker con-
trolling any at most t participants can learn is condi-
tionally independent on Π, A and α¯ given requested
data α∗ and prior knowledge Γ.
P (σ | α,Γ,Π, A) = P (σ | α∗,Γ)
This concept of requested privacy is the strongest
known relevant privacy concept and can be relaxed
for computational purposes to:
Definition 12 (non-uniform requested privacy)
Given secret inputs σ, the prior knowledge Γ of t
colluders and a multi-party computation process Π
with answer α that can be decomposed in a desired
data α∗ and an algorithmic dependent unrequested
data α¯, we say that an algorithm A achieves
non-uniform requested t-privacy if for any secret
σ¯ ∈ σ that is not deterministically revealed given
requested data α and prior knowledge Γ, it is also
not deterministically revealed given Π, A, and α¯, to
any attacker controlling any at most t participants.
∀σ¯ ∈ σP (σ¯ | α∗,Γ) < 1⇒ P (σ¯ | α,Γ,Π, A) < 1
• Privacy of Constraint Topology
It was shown in (Silaghi 2004a;
Silaghi, Faltings, and Petcu 2006) that erasing
topological information information by combining
all constraints into a big n-ary function maximizes
privacy. Further, the protection of topological
information can be a secret in itself, with application
to protecting trade secrets, as in (Silaghi et al. 2001;
Silaghi and Faltings 2002c).
• Agent Identity Privacy Hiding the real identity
of the agents participating in a DCOP is a concern
discussed in (Le´aute´ and Faltings 2013). This refers
to the general concept of anonymity, where software
agents cannot be linked to human owners.
Steganographic DCOPs
Besides the previous types of privacy, we raise the next
one:
• Privacy of Existence of Secrets In an observation
we introduce here, note that for many of the studied
DCOP frameworks, the agents that participate in the
computation may need to suggest or admit that there
exist secrets involved in the computation, without
which the additional costs of the setup and execution
would not be warranted.
But admitting that secrets may be involved is some-
times a significant privacy loss in itself, for example
when agents want to claim openness for political rea-
sons. This concept is introduced in this paper, with
the Steganographic DCOP.
Steganography is the area of cryptography concerned
with hiding of the existence of secret information.
While the oldest example of steganography dates from
Histaeus’ 499BC message tattooed under the hair of a
slave’s head, as described by Herodotus, the best known
modern techniques range from invisible ink to hiding of
data in poetry and images.
Steganography is more appropriate then cryptogra-
phy for the case of secrets with social impact, as is
often the case with distributed constraint optimiza-
tion (DCOP). With social impacts, an agent may lose
status simply by stating that it has secrets, and trying
to safeguard them. Politicians (and not only them) try
to claim openness and lack of secrets.
In our experience, the need to protect existence of
secrets proved to be a key impediment to the large scale
adoption of cryptographic DCOP solvers, since many
potential users find it difficult to publicly admit a need,
or to call for secret problem solving.
In this work we identify the steganographic potential
of traditional DCOP solvers where the technical dis-
tribution of the problem can be claimed as the unique
cause of avoiding decentralization and straightforward
full revelation, allowing to hide privacy needs.
The basic framework recommended for stegano-
graphic DCOPs, rephrasing variable ownership require-
ments as unary constraint, is:
Definition 13 (StegDomDCOP) A Steganographic
Domain Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem
(StegDomDCOP) consists of n agents A = {a1, ..., an}
and n variables V = {x1, x2, ...xn}. Each agent ai has
a unary constraint on xi and its domain Di. Agents
know weighed constraints on subsets of these variables,
specifying costs and rewards induced by assignments to
concerned variables. Each agent can also identify, for
each cost it associates with a total assignment, a secret
reward for not revealing it.
The goal is to choose values for variables such that
an objective function is minimized or maximized, while
each agent’s participation is rational, performing only
acts with positive expected sum of costs and rewards.
The objective function described is addition over costs,
but can be any associative, commutative, monotonic ag-
gregation operator defined over a totally ordered set of
valuations, with minimum and maximum elements.
The requirement of having the number of vari-
ables equal the number of agents can be dropped,
together with the requirement that each agent has
a unary constraint on a distinct variable, ob-
taining an equivalent framework that maps eas-
ier to certain problems, like to the problems
in (Silaghi, Sam-Haroud, and Faltings 2000b):
Definition 14 (StegCosDCOP) A Steganographic
Cost Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem
(StegCosDCOP) consists of m agents A = {a1, ..., am}
and n variables V = {x1, x2, ...xn}. Agents know
weighed constraints on subsets of these variables,
specifying costs and rewards induced by assignments to
concerned variables. Each agent can also identify, for
each cost it associates with a total assignment, a secret
reward for not revealing it.
The goal is to choose values for variables such that
an objective function is minimized or maximized, while
each agent’s participation is rational, performing only
acts with positive expected sum of costs and rewards.
The objective function described is addition over costs,
but can be any associative, commutative, monotonic ag-
gregation operator defined over a totally ordered set of
valuations, with minimum and maximum elements.
The fact that the last two frameworks are
equivalent in expression power is guaranteed
by the theory of primal dual CSP conver-
sions (Bacchus and Van Beek 1998). However, mod-
eling strategies and solvers may perform significantly
better with one rather than the other approach, since
the transformation between representations can be
laborious.
The StegDCOP framework has the advantage that
its agent problems can be masqueraded as instances
of any common DCOP framework, and can be
used in asynchronous search protocols to protect
privacy without making other agents suspicious, as
in (Silaghi and Faltings 2002a).
The framework enables the support of privacy of con-
straints and privacy of domains in a similar way to UD-
COP and DCSPs.
Frameworks Disambiguation
Distributed Constraint Optimization Frameworks can
be classified along the following independent dimen-
sions:
• X1 semiring/value system: Boolean, Fuzzy,
Weighted, Probabilistic
• X2 structure of the problem: Static,
Dynamic Local (D L), Dynamic Topology (D T)
• X3 whether domains are known only by some agents,
by everyone with variable ownership (enabling exten-
sional constraint representation), or with distribution
of constraints. Combinations are possible. The corre-
sponding distribution reasons are named: Domains,
Variables, Costs, Domains Costs (D C), ...
• X4 privacy of decision specification, for opening all
assignments in the adopted solution to everyone, or
only to specified agents: Open, Closed
• X5 privacy management, where participants claim
no privacy and do not secretly quantify privacy con-
cerns, where participants claim privacy and secretly
quantify its loss, where participants claim no pri-
vacy but secretly quantify privacy concerns, and
where secrecy is admitted and enforced with cryp-
tography: Public, Quantified, Steganographic,
Cryptographic1
• X6 optimization function with utilitarian summa-
tion of constraints, egalitarian Leximin, or egalitarian
Theil index2: Utilitarian, Leximin, Theil
A nomenclature can be designed to easily differen-
tiate between the different types of frameworks, or to
enable studies of framework relations and hierarchy.
To maximize compatibility with past practice and the
logic of the framework design, the proposed name struc-
ture is:
X6X5X4DisX3X2X1COP (1)
where each of the names can be in camel case on
any unambiguous prefix of the above properties, to
enable disambiguation and easy extensions. The new
nomenclature (1) is long and shorter versions can be
obtained by selecting as defaults: X6=Utilitarian,
X5=Public, X4=Open, X3=Domain, X2=Static,
X1=Weighted. Each default parameter can be skipped
if all other parameters it separates from the base string
“Dis” are at their default value. Further, the Boolean-
COP can also be historically named as CSP.
With these conventions, for example:
1See (Yokoo, Suzuki, and Hirayama 2002; Silaghi 2003;
Silaghi and Mitra 2004; Grinshpoun et al. 2019;
Grinshpoun and Tassa 2016)
2See (Matsui et al. 2018; Netzer and Meisels 2011)
• DCOP. The common DCOP in Defini-
tion 5 (Modi et al. 2002) becomes Utilitarian-
Public-Open-Dis-Domains-Static-Weighted-COP or
shorter UPODisDSWCOP With the use of defaults, the
acronym becomes DisCOP.
• UDCOP. UDCOPs (Savaux et al. 2017) with
full camel case specifiers becomes Utilitarian-
Quantified-Open-Dis-Domains-Static-Weighted-
COP or shorter, UQODisDSWCOP. With the use of
defaults, the acronym becomes QODisCOP.
• The new StegDomDCOP framework in Defini-
tion 13 becomes Utilitarian-Steganographic-
Open-Dis-Domains-Static-Weighted-COP. With the
use of defaults, the acronym becomes SODisCOP.
• The new StegCosDCOP framework in Defini-
tion 14 becomes Utilitarian-Steganographic-
Open-Dis-Costs-Static-Weighted-COP.With the use
of defaults, the acronym becomes SODisCCOP.
• DisWCSP. The DisWCSP in Defini-
tion 7 (Silaghi 2005a) becomes Utilitarian-
Cryptographic-Closed-Dis-Costs-Static-
Weighted-COP or UCCDisCSWCOP. With the use
of defaults, the acronym becomes CCDisCCOP.
• DCSP. With this proposal, the original DCSP
in Definition 3 (Yokoo et al. 1992) is denoted
Utilitarian-Public-Open-Dis-Domains-Static-
Boolean-COP or UPODisDSBCOP. With the use
of defaults, the acronym becomes DisCSP,
as that acronym was used in several previous
works (Silaghi, Sam-haroud, and Faltings 2001).
• DisCSP With the use of defaults, the DisC-
SPs with private constraints from Defini-
tion 4 (Silaghi and Faltings 2005) is denoted
Utilitarian-Public-Open-Dis-Domains Costs-
Static-Boolean-COP or UPODisD CSBCOP and would
be denoted shortly DisD CCSP.
We note that the term “Open” that we pro-
pose for specifying the publication of the final de-
cisions, has been used in the past as synonym for
dynamism (Silaghi and Faltings 2002b). The term
“Utilitarian” DCOP has been used for specifying ex-
plicit representation of Privacy, but also to express util-
itarian maximization of social welfare (Walras 1896).
However, the possible acronyms in the new nomencla-
ture will not conflict with prior notations (that did not
already have conflict, like DCSP).
Conclusion
We have identified a new type of privacy relevant to
Distributed Constraint Optimization, namely privacy
of existence of secrets, leading to the formal introduc-
tion of the Steganographic DCOPs. The new framework
allows for disambiguate between problems where pri-
vacy is public but quantified and when privacy require-
ments are hidden (steganography). We review existing
frameworks offering privacy in constraint optimization
to position the new type of privacy in the literature, and
propose a new nomenclature system that, if adopted,
can help disambiguate all privacy frameworks found in
use. Further, the obtained classification can be used to
identify gaps in the literature as well as valuable new
frameworks to study.
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